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The non-OPEG developing countries suffered external shocks of considerable
magnitude after 1973. In the 1973-78 period, these shocks included the qua-
drupling of petroleum prices, which took full effect in 1974, and the world
recession of 1974-75, which was followed by a relatively slow recovery. The
external shocks adversely affected the balance of payments of the countries in
question through the deterioration of their terms of trade and through the
slowdowns in the growth of foreign demand for their export products.
The non-OPEG developing countries adopted various policy measures in
response to these external shocks. Depending on the country concerned, the
policy responses involved additional external financing, export promotion, im-
port substitution, and lowering the rate of economic growth.
In this paper I shall examine the economic effects of external shocks, and of
the policy measures taken in response to these shocks, in three Latin-American
countries (Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay) during the 1973-78 period. Brazil
and Uruguay are representative of countries that suffered the consequences
of increased petroleum prices, but they differ in the policies adopted. The terms
of trade deteriorated to a much lesser extent in Mexico, which started exporting
substantial quantities of petroleum in 1977. At the same time, the choice of
1978 as the terminal year permits separation of the effects of the two oil shocks,
the second being the approximate doubling of petroleum prices in 1979.
In the first section I shall describe the analytical framework used in estimating
the balance of payments effects of external shocks, and of the policy measures
taken in response to these shocks, with further consideration given to the
treatment of internal shocks. In the second I present the estimates made for
the three countries. Finally, in the third, I shall consider the policies applied
and relate these to the results obtained. The relevant formulas are shown in the
Appendix.132 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND OF POLICY
RESPONSES TO THESE SHOCKS: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
External Shocks
The effects of external shocks on the balance of payments of the countries
under study have been estimated by postulating a situation that would have
occurred in the absence of these shocks. In so doing, separate consideration has
been given to the deterioration of the terms of trade (terms-of-trade effects)
and the slowdown in the growth of foreign demand for the exports (export
volume effects)
1 of the countries in question.
Terms-of-Trade Effects
In estimating the terms-of-trade effects of external shocks, the average for
the years 1971-73 has been taken as the basis. It may be objected that, due to
the effects of the world boom of 1972-73, the terms of trade of the developing
countries were particularly favorable in 1971-73. However, the differences as
compared with the 1960s are small, and the terms of trade of the developing
countries in 1971-73 were in fact slightly less favorable than in the 1960s
2 if
we exclude fuel, the price of which started to rise in late 1973.
In making estimates, changes in the terms of trade as compared with the
1971-73 base period have been attributed to external shocks. The underlying
assumption is that the country in question is a price-taker in world markets.
Such an assumption applies grosso modo to the principal exports of the three
countries under study, the chief exception being coffee in Brazil. Nevertheless,
in the absence of the explicit modeling of the world coffee market, the assump-
tion has been retained in this case also.
Terms-of-trade effects have been calculated by revaluing imports and ex-
ports in the average prices of the years 1971-73 (for short "1972"), and taking
the difference between current-price values and the constant-price values
thereby obtained. They have further been decomposed into a pure terms-of-
trade effect, calculated on the assumption of balanced trade in terms of "1972"
prices, and the effects of the rise in import prices on unbalanced trade (the
deficit or surplus in the balance of merchandise trade estimated in "1972"
prices) .
3
In order to indicate the impact of the quadrupling of petroleum prices on
the terms of trade, the balance of payments effects of changes in the price of
fuel and nonfuel imports are separately shown. On the export side, distinction
has been made between traditional primary exports,
4 taken individually, fuels,
nontraditional primary exports other than fuels, and manufactured goods.
Export Volume Effects
The trend value of exports that would have occurred in the absence of ex-
ternal shocks has been estimated on the assumption that the world exports ofEXTERNAL SHOCKS 133
the country's traditional primary export products, taken individually, and the
developing countries' exports of fuels, nontraditional primary products other
than fuels, and manufactured goods grew at the same rate as in the preceding
decade and the country concerned maintained its "1972" market share in these
exports. The underlying assumption is that a developing country competes
against all suppliers in the world market for its traditional primary exports
while its nontraditional exports compete against those of other developing
countries.
The effects of changes in foreign demand have been derived as the difference
between the trend value of exports and the hypothetical value of exports, both
estimated in "1972" prices. Hypothetical exports have been calculated on the
assumptions that the country's exports of traditional primary products rose at
the same rate as world exports, and that its exports of fuels, nontraditional
primary products other than fuels, and manufactured goods increased at the
same rate as developing country exports, between "1972" and 1978. It thus
again reflects the assumption that the country maintained its "1972" market
share during the period under consideration.
In the case of manufactured exports, we have further distinguished the
effects of lower foreign GNP growth rates from the effects of changes in the
foreign income elasticities of import demand which have been taken to reflect
the effects of trade policy measures in the importing countries. For this purpose,
we have calculated the constant-price value of exports that would have been
obtained if foreign income elasticities of import demand remained the same as
in the 1963-73 period and the country in question maintained its "1972" share
in these exports.
The difference between the trend value and the constant-income-elasticity
value of exports has been taken to reflect the effects of the decline in GNP
growth rates abroad while the difference between the constant-income-elasticity
value and the hypothetical exports has been used to express the effects of
changes in foreign income elasticities of import demand. Separate calculations
have been made for the country's exports to developed, developing, and cen-
trally planned economies.
Policy Responses to External Shocks
Additional Net External Financing
Among policy measures taken in response to external shocks, the amount of
additional external financing has been estimated as the difference between the
actual resource gap and the trend value of the resource gap. The latter has
been calculated on the assumption that past trends in the constant-price value
of imports and exports continued and import and export prices remained un-
changed, taking further the actual net balance of nonfactor services and private
transfers as a datum. The procedure used assumes that, in obtaining additional134 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
external financing, the countries in question were not constrained by borrowing
limitations abroad. This assumption does not exclude the possibility that in-
creased borrowing occurred at higher interest rates.
Export Promotion
The effects of export promotion have been represented by changes in exports
associated with changes in the country's "1972" market share. This has been
done by taking the difference between the constant-price value of actual and
hypothetical exports. Separate calculations have been made for traditional
primary products, taken individually, fuels, nontraditional primary products
other than fuels, and manufactured goods.
Import Substitution
Import substitution is defined as savings in imports associated with a decrease
in the country's income elasticity of import demand. It has been derived by
taking the difference between the constant-price values of hypothetical and
actual imports, when the former has been obtained by combining actual GNP
growth rates with income elasticities of import demand estimated for the 1963—
73 period. Separate calculations have been made for fuel and for nonfuel
imports.
Lowering Economic Growth Rates
The effects on imports of lower economic growth rates in the country con-
cerned have been estimated as the difference between the constant-price values
of imports calculated for GNP growth rates observed in the 1963—73 period
(the trend value of imports) and for actual GNP growth rates observed during
the period under consideration (the hypothetical value of imports), applying
income elasticities of import demand estimated for the 1963-73 period in both
cases. Again, separate calculations have been made for fuel and for nonfuel
imports.
It should be noted, however, that changes in export market shares and in the
rate of economic growth may have been due to circumstances outside the
country's control. A decrease (increase) in the country's export market share
may have occurred because of an acceleration (deceleration) of exports by
competing suppliers. In turn, a fall in foreign demand for the country's export
products may have contributed to a decline in its rate of economic growth.
Changes in export market shares, in import demand, and in the rate of
economic growth may also have been due to internal events. In particular,
domestic policy changes may have occurred independently of external shocks
and may themselves constitute an "internal" shock. The methodology applied
does not permit separating the balance of payments effects of policy changes
taken in response to external shocks from the effects of autonomous domesticEXTERNAL SHOCKS 135
policy changes; such distinctions necessarily become a matter of interpretation.
The estimates reported in this paper have been made for the years 1974 to
1978, taken individually.
5 Averages for the 1974-78 period are also shown. This
permits considering changes over time and indicating the results for the entire
period.
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND OF POLICY
RESPONSES TO THESE SHOCKS: ESTIMATES
Table 1 reports the estimated effects of external shocks, and of policy mea-
sures taken in response to these shocks, on the balance of payments of the
three countries under study. The estimated balance of payments effects have
further been related to exports, imports, the average of exports and imports,
and GNP, all expressed in "1972" prices.
More detailed estimates are provided in Appendix Table 1. Appendix Table
2 disaggregates the foreign demand effects on the manufactured exports of
Brazil. Appendix Tables 3 and 4 show the extent of export shortfalls due to the
deceleration of the growth of foreign demand, and the gains (losses) resulting
from increases (decreases) in export market shares, for the various commodity
categories and for individual traditional primary exports, respectively. Appen-
dix Table 3 also provides information on the extent of import substitution, and
on the decline of imports due to the deceleration of the rate of economic growth,
for both fuels and nonfuels.
External Shocks
Terms of Trade Effects
Among the three countries under study, Brazil and Uruguay suffered a sub-
stantial deterioration of their terms of trade in 1974, amounting to about 50
percent of the average value of their exports and imports in that year. The
quadrupling of petroleum prices was the principal factor contributing to these
changes while increases in the prices of non-oil imports and exports were nearly
in balance.
At the same time, given its higher trade share, the ratio of the terms of trade
loss to GNP was greater in Uruguay (3.9 percent) than in Brazil (3.3 percent);
and, with the price of its principal traditional export, beef, declining after
1974, Uruguay's terms of trade deteriorated further in subsequent years. The
terms-of-trade loss reached a peak, amounting to 64.1 percent of the average
value of exports and imports and 6.5 percent of GNP in 1977; the correspond-
ing ratios were 55.7 percent and 5.4 percent in the 1974-78 period, on the
average. As shown in Appendix Table 1, the estimated terms of trade loss was
even larger if it is calculated under the assumption of balanced trade in "1972"
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Brazil benefited from increases in the prices of its coffee and soybean exports
after 1974. Export prices were the most favorable in 1977, when the terms of
trade loss as compared with "1972" was 13.3 percent of the average value of ex-
ports and imports and 0.7 percent of GNP. The terms of trade deteriorated
again in 1978, with the resulting loss amounting to 31.3 percent of the average
value of exports and imports and 1.7 percent of GNP; these ratios averaged
38.2 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively, in the entire 1974-78 period. About
one-half of the loss due to the terms-of-trade effects reflects the impact of
increased import prices on Brazil's trade deficit, estimated in "1972" prices.
Mexico imported only a small quantity of petroleum even before the dis-
covery of large oil deposits in the mid-1970s. Correspondingly, it suffered a
smaller terms-of-trade loss than Brazil and Uruguay in 1974, amounting to 21.5
percent of the average value of exports and imports and 1.3 percent of GNP.
Following a temporary deterioration in 1975, the situation improved in subse-
quent years, largely as a result of the benefits Mexico derived from higher prices
on its rising petroleum exports. By 1977, Mexico enjoyed a net gain from terms-
of-trade changes, although this gave rise to a small loss in 1978 when import
prices rose rapidly. The terms-of-trade loss was 14.8 percent of the value of
trade and 0.8 of GNP in 1974-78, on the average. This loss was due to the im-
pact of increased import prices on Mexico's trade deficit, estimated in "1972"
prices, as the "pure" terms-of-trade effect, calculated on the assumption of
balanced trade in terms of "1972" prices, was favorable.
Export Volume Effects
In 1974, export volume effects, calculated in "1972" prices, were much smaller
than the terms-of-trade effects in all three countries. Assuming unchanged ex-
port market shares, the export shortfall due to the slowdown in the growth of
foreign demand equalled 3.4 percent of the value of exports in Brazil, 5.3
percent in Mexico, and 12.6 percent in Uruguay. In the same year, the ratio of
the export shortfall to GNP was 0.2 percent in Brazil and in Mexico and 1.1
percent in Uruguay.
The observed intercountry differences in export shortfalls are explained by
differences in the commodity composition of exports. Brazil and, in particular,
Mexico benefited from the relatively high export share of manufactured goods
(18 percent and 41 percent in "1972"), for which foreign demand continued
to rise in 1974. But, while Mexico was adversely affected by a decline in the
world exports of cattle, the unfavorable effects of the world recession on
Brazil's exports were attenuated by relatively strong demand for oilcake, oil-
seeds, and iron ore. Finally, manufactured goods accounted for a small share
of Uruguay's exports (9 percent), which also suffered the adverse consequences
of a decline in foreign demand for wool.
In subsequent years, demand for the exports of Brazil and Mexico by and
large paralleled the world business cycle, with a shortfall in export volume138 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
experienced in 1975 and 1977 and gains in 1976.
6 At the same time, in both
countries, the ratio of the export shortfall to the value of exports was consider-
ably higher in 1978 (13.0 percent in Brazil and 15.5 percent in Mexico) than
it had been in 1974. For the period as a whole, this ratio averaged 9.4 percent
in Brazil and 13.3 percent in Mexico, equalling 0.5 percent of GNP in both
cases.
Different developments are shown in Uruguay. While the ratio of the export
shortfall to the value of exports remained relatively high in 1975 (10.5 percent),
it fell to a considerable extent in subsequent years. The ratio averaged 2.7 per-
cent in 1976-77, when the rise in world demand for beef and wool led to
positive export-volume effects for traditional exports. With some deterioration
in 1978, the foreign-demand-induced losses in export volume averaged 5.9 per-
cent of export value, and 0.6 percent of GNP, in the 1974-78 period, on the
average.
Conclusions
The results indicate the relative importance of terms-of-trade effects and,
within these effects, that of the loss suffered due to increases in petroleum prices,
in Brazil and in Uruguay in the 1974-78 period. On the average, the loss due
to terms-of-trade effects amounted to 2.2 percent of GNP in Brazil and 5.4
percent in Uruguay during this period, whereas export volume effects were
0.5 percent and 0.6 percent in the two countries, respectively. Terms-of-trade
effects averaged 0.8 percent of GNP in Mexico, which imported little petroleum
even before the discoveries in the mid-1970s, while export volume effects were
0.5 percent of GNP.
These conclusions conflict with the conventional wisdom that gives emphasis
to the unfavorable effects of the 1974-75 world recession and the subsequent
slow recovery in the developed countries on the balance of payments of the
developing countries. Nor does one find evidence of the alleged adverse effects
of increased protectionism on the exports of manufactured goods by the de-
veloping countries. As is apparent from Appendix Table 1, the average foreign
income elasticity of demand for the manufactured exports of these countries
rose during the period under consideration, offsetting in part the unfavorable
effects of lower GNP growth rates.
7
Appendix Table 2 reports estimates of growth effects and income elasticity
effects on Brazil's exports in a geographical disaggregation. The data show
that only the centrally planned economies experienced a decline in their in-
come elasticity of demand for the manufactured exports of the developing
countries during the period under consideration. In the developed countries,
which continued to provide markets for most of the developing countries'
exports of manufactured goods, increases in the income elasticity of demand
for these exports offset one-fifth of the export shortfall
8 due to their lowerEXTERNAL SHOCKS 139
GNP growth rates. In turn, increases in the income elasticity of demand en-
hanced the favorable effects of higher GNP growth rates on intra-LDC trade
in manufactured goods.
The Balance of Payments Effect of Policy Responses to External Shocks
In the 1974-78 period, on the average, the balance of payments effects of
external shocks were estimated at 2.7 percent of GNP in Brazil, 1.3 percent in
Mexico and 6.1 percent in Uruguay. In absolute terms, the relevant magni-
tudes are $2.9 billion in Brazil, $0.7 billion in Mexico, and $0.2 billion in
Uruguay (Table 1).
It is apparent that there are considerable differences among the three coun-
tries as far as policy responses to external shocks are concerned. In Brazil, addi-
tional net external financing ($791 million) provided about one-fourth, and
import substitution ($1,941 million) two-thirds, of balance of payments re-
quirements attendant upon the external shocks. At the same time, the gain
from increased export market shares ($442 million) was in large part offset
by the rise in imports resulting from high GNP growth rates in Brazil ($278
million) ,
9
The contribution of additional net external financing surpassed two-thirds of
the total in Uruguay, amounting to $137 million in 1974-78, on the average.
Increased export market shares ($70 million) was another important factor in
attenuating the effects of external shocks. However, the acceleration of eco-
nomic growth added $20 million to Uruguay's import bill and import substi-
tution amounted to only $7 million. Nonetheless, the net effects of the domestic
policy measures (that is, excluding external financing) on Uruguay's balance of
payments were strongly positive.
Different conclusions apply to Mexico where decreases in export market
shares ($198 million) and negative import substitution ($719 million) were
offset only in part by the favorable balance of payments effects of lower GNP
growth rates ($178 million). Correspondingly, average net external financing in
1974-78 ($1,442 million) was more than double the balance of payments effects
of external shocks in Mexico.
In what follows, I shall examine the balance of payments effects of policy
responses to external shocks in the three countries in the 1974-78 period, on the
average. Subsequently, in the third section, the policy measures employed in
the individual countries will be discussed and the effects of these policies on
the time pattern of the results indicated.
Additional Net External Financing
In the 1974-78 period, on the average, additional net external financing
amounted to 12.7 percent of the average value of exports and imports in
Brazil, 47.8 percent in Mexico, and 44.0 percent in Uruguay. But, given its140 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
larger trade share in GNP, the ratio of additional net external financing to
GNP was higher in Uruguay (4.3 percent) than in Mexico (2.6 percent), with
Brazil (0.7 percent) occupying third place.
It will be recalled that additional net external financing has been estimated
as the difference between the actual resource gap (the balance for goods, non-
factor services, and private transfers) and its trend value (the difference be-
tween the trend values of imports and exports), both expressed in "1972"
prices, adjusted for the actual net balance of nonfactor services and private
transfers. In Brazil, the trend value of the resource gap was 2.9 percent of
GNP in 1974-78, on the average; the comparable figures are —0.6 percent in
Mexico, and —2.2 percent in Uruguay.
In the case of Brazil, the relatively high trend value of the resource gap re-
flects the fact that its "1972" trade deficit would have increased further if ex-
port and import trends observed in the preceding decade continued. In turn,
improvements in its service balance and increases in private transfers would
have eliminated Mexico's resource gap, had past trends in exports and imports
continued. Finally, the continuation of export and import trends would have
led to further increases in the surplus in the balance for goods, nonfactor ser-
vices, and private transfers which Uruguay experienced in "1972."
In the 1974-78 period, the actual resource gap (net external financing)
averaged 3.6 percent of GNP in Brazil, 2.0 percent in Mexico, and 2.1 percent
in Uruguay. In absolute terms, the relevant figures are Brazil, $3,880 million;
Mexico, $1,098 million; and Uruguay, $67 million. In the same period, interest
payments and dividends amounted to $3,188 million, $2,257 million, and $75
million in the three countries, respectively.
1
0 As a result, total external financ-
ing averaged $7,068 million in Brazil, $3,355 million in Mexico, and $142 mil-
lion in Uruguay (Table 2).
There are some differences among the three countries as far as the sources of
total external financing are concerned. If we combine errors and omissions
(mostly unreported short-term capital flows) with portfolio capital, we find that
the latter accounted for 90 percent of total external financing in Brazil, 72 per-
cent in Mexico, and 106 percent in Uruguay. Foreign direct investment ac-
counted for another 20 percent of external financing in Brazil, 18 percent in
in Mexico, and 27 percent in Uruguay. In turn, Uruguay devoted 27 percent
of total external financing to accumulate reserves during the period; the com-
parable figures are 16 percent for Brazil and 3 percent for Mexico.
Export Promotion
Uruguay showed the best export performance during the 1974-78 period,
with increases in its export market shares accounting for more than one-fifth of
its exports, on the average (Table 1). This gain came almost exclusively from
manufactured exports, in particular leather, clothing, and shoes. ManufacturedEXTERNAL SHOCKS 141
exports averaging $103 million in 1974-78 as compared with hypothetical ex-
ports of $35 million, calculated under the assumption that Uruguay maintained
its "1972" share in developing country exports of manufactured goods. A slight
gain is also shown in nontraditional primary exports other than fuels and a
small loss in traditional primary exports. In the latter case, the gain in market
shares in wool, with actual exports exceeding hypothetical exports by 15 per-
cent, more than offset the 6 percent loss in beef, with practically no change
shown in the case of wool tops (Appendix Tables 3 and 4).
Brazil also increased its average export market share, albeit to a much lesser
extent than Uruguay, representing a gain of less than one-thirteenth of ex-
ports. This result reflects gains obtained in regard to nontraditional exports
other than fuels, where actual exports exceeded hypothetical exports by 39 per-
cent, as well as in regard to manufactured goods, where this ratio was 21 per-
cent. In the first case, fruits and vegetables and vegetable oils (in particular,
soybean oil, representing the domestic transformation of soybeans); in the
second, nonelectrical machinery, transport equipment, iron and steel, textiles,
electrical machinery, footwear, and clothing, in this order, were largely re-
sponsible for the outcome.
In turn, a small loss is shown for traditional primary exports and for fuels,
the latter which represent an insignificant part of Brazil's exports. Among
traditional primary exports, there is a wide divergence among individual com-
modities. Gains in actual as compared with hypothetical exports are shown for
oilseed cake (90 percent), iron ore (63 percent), cocoa beans (43 percent),
and soybeans (12 percent) as against losses of 78 percent for cotton, 71 percent
for coniferous sawnwood, 53 percent for meat, 34 percent for sugar, and 32
percent for coffee, with practically no change for castor oil.
Finally losses in market shares were responsible for a decline in the exports
of Mexico by one-tenth. The losses were the largest in traditional primary
exports, amounting to 22 percent of hypothetical exports. Mexico experienced
a gain in its world market share only in the case of coffee, where actual exports
exceeded hypothetical exports by 23 percent, with no change shown for to-
matoes. Losses for the other products were sugar, 79 percent; beef, 46 percent;
cattle, 33 percent; crustaceans and molluscs, 25 percent; and cotton, 6 percent.
Mexico also experienced a loss in its market share for nontraditional exports
other than fuels (21 percent) and manufactured goods (11 percent). By con-
trast, actual exports of fuels exceeded hypothetical exports more than six times.
The resulting gain in fuel exports equalled one-third of the loss in the other
commodity groups.
Import Substitution
Brazil leads in terms of import substitution in the period 1974-78, with actual
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assumption of unchanged income elasticity of import demand for total imports
on the average. The same result is obtained for fuel and for nonfuel imports
taken separately (Appendix Table 3).
Uruguay also experienced considerable import substitution in fuels (18 per-
cent) that was in part offset by negative import substitution in other products
(1 percent). As a result of these changes, Uruguay showed a small degree of
net import substitution, with the difference between actual and hypothetical
imports being 2 percent.
In turn, Mexico experienced negative net import substitution, raising its im-
port bill by about one-fifth. With the discovery of new deposits leading to
positive import substitution in fuels, where actual import hardly exceeded
one-fourth of hypothetical imports, the extent of negative import substitution
in nonfuel imports was even larger (27 percent).
Lowering Economic Growth Rates
The import saving resulting from the decline in the rate of growth of GNP
amounted to 4 percent of the total imports of Mexico in the 1974-78 period
on the average. By contrast, the acceleration of the rate of economic growth
raised the import bill by 3 percent in Brazil and 8 percent in Uruguay. How-
ever, as already noted, the Brazilian result is affected by the choice of the base
year.
THE POLICIES APPLIED
In the following, I shall consider the policy measures applied in the three
countries under study, relate them to the time pattern of the estimates, and ex-
amine their economic effects. Apart from Tables 1 and 2 referred to earlier,
use will be made of information on the money supply, government revenue
and expenditures (Table 3), changes in real exchange rates (Table 4), and
foreign debt and debt servicing (Table 5); other data cited originate in the
World Bank data bank. The discussion will proceed by taking the three coun-
tries individually; a brief comparative evaluation will be made in the
conclusion.
Brazil
Brazil's resource gap increased from $1.0 billion in "1972" to $6.3 billion in
1974 (Table 2). The principal factors contributing to this increase were the
deterioration of the terms of trade ($3.1 billion, of which the rise in fuel prices
represented $2.4 billion) and the acceleration of imports, reflecting in part the
effects of high GNP growth rates ($0.6 billion) and in part negative import
substitution ($0.7 billion), due largely to stock-building. Interest payments
and dividends further raised Brazil's total external financing requirements to
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investment ($1.3 billion), reductions in reserve holdings ($1.0 billion), and
interest receipts on foreign holdings ($0.7 billion).
The increase in the resource gap and the uncertainties associated with the
installation of the new government give rise to a relatively restrictive monetary
and fiscal policy stance from mid-1974. With the acceleration of inflation (the
wholesale price index rose by 29 percent in 1974 as compared with 17 percent
in 1973), the real value of the money supply increased by only 3 percent in
1974 as compared with 28 percent in 1973. The relevant figures are 7 and 18
percent for government expenditures and 12 and 20 percent for government
revenues, resulting in a surplus in the budget (Table 3).
The restrictive monetary and fiscal stance had its effect on economic activity
with a time lag, and the rate of growth of GNP declined from 9.8 percent in
1974 to 5.1 percent in 1975. The deceleration of economic growth was con-
centrated in manufacturing industries. The slowdown in industrial expansion
and the strong showing of the opposition in the November 1974 elections led
to the adoption of a more expansionary monetary policy in the second quarter
of 1975, with the real value of the money supply rising by 9 percent for the year
as a whole. Also, the budget surplus disappeared and the government undertook
considerable expenditures outside the budget.
These expenditures were in large part designed to develop import-substituting
industries producing intermediate products in the framework of the Second
National Development Plan. The plan called for large investments in pulp and
paper, petrochemicals, fertilizer, steel, and nonferrous metals, with the objec-
tive to reach — or to approach — levels of self-sufficiency by 1979.
Investments in intermediate products were accompanied by measures taken
to promote capital goods industries, utilizing a combination of import restric-
tions, fiscal incentives, and credit preferences. Additional measures that aimed
at reducing imports in general included increases in tariffs, advance deposit
requirements, restrictions on private imports, and limitations on imports by
public institutions and firms.
Measures were also taken to increase incentives to exports by the use of credit
preferences and, subsequently, the so-called BEFIEX scheme, under which
additional subsidies are provided to firms that undertake long-term export
commitments. The extent of these measures was, however, substantially less
than that of the measures of import protection, thereby increasing the bias
against exports that had existed already in 1973. At the same time, the
cruzeiro was devalued but little in real terms (Table 4).
The measures taken gave rise to considerable import substitution, equalling
36 percent of import value by 1976, increasing further to 57 percent in 1977
and to 60 percent in 1978.
1
1 In turn, while Brazil increased its export shares
in 1975, it suffered a substantial decline in 1976 and, notwithstanding sub-
sequent increases, it reached only one-half of the gain experienced in 1975,EXTERNAL SHOCKS 149
as a proportion of exports, in 1978. Changes after 1975 may be explained by
the increased emphasis given to import substitution as well as by the apprecia-
tion of the cruzeiro in real terms.
Import substitution, higher export shares, and the fall in the rate of growth
of GNP in 1975 led to a reduction in Brazil's resource gap from $6.3 billion in
1974 to $4.9 billion in 1975. Total external financing declined to a lesser ex-
tent (from $8.3 billion to $7.3 billion), reflecting increased interest charges
on existing debt. It was financed by foreign borrowing ($5.0 billion), foreign
direct investment ($1.1 billion), and reductions in reserve holdings ($1.0
billion).
The adoption of expansionary monetary policies contributed to the accelera-
tion of economic growth in 1976, with GNP rising by 8.7 percent. Increased im-
port substitution, however, more than offset the higher imports attendant on
the acceleration of growth and the decline in export market shares. Cor-
respondingly, Brazil's resource gap declined from $4.9 billion in 1975 to $3.8
billion in 1976 and total external financing fell from $7.3 billion to $6.7 bil-
lion. Foreign borrowing ($7.0 billion, to which $1.0 billion of errors and omis-
sions should be added), however, exceeded this amount as Brazil accumulated
foreign exchange reserves ($2.7 billion).
In response to the acceleration of inflation, with the wholesale price index
rising at an annual rate in excess of 40 percent, restrictive monetary policies
were again adopted in the second half of 1976 and were maintained until mid-
1977. These policies were reflected in the decline in the real value of the money
supply by 3 percent in 1976 and by 4 percent in 1977. However, in 1976, gov-
ernment expenditures rose by 22 percent in real terms and only in 1977 did the
rate of growth of these expenditures decline to 3 percent. At the same time,
the growth of extra-budgetary expenditures accelerated, leading to considerable
financing in domestic and in foreign capital markets.
Restrictive monetary policies contributed to a slowdown in economic
expansion, with GNP rising by 4.5 percent in 1977. The resulting decline in
import requirements, together with increased import substitution and the rise
in export market shares, led to a further decrease in Brazil's resource gap to
$1.6 billion in 1977. Total external financing requirements fell to $5.4 billion,
notwithstanding the growing burden of interest payments and dividends ($3.8
billion). Foreign borrowing decreased also, from $7.0 billion in 1976 to $4.5
billion in 1977, and the decline was even greater if the $0.6 negative adjustment
for errors and omissions is taken into account.
In response to the slowdown of economic activity, monetary policy became
more expansionary in mid-1977, with the money supply rising at an average
annual rate of 4 percent in real terms until mid-1978, when a restrictive policy
was again adopted. The gross domestic product rose by 5.8 percent, while the
resource gap increased to $2.7 billion and total external financing to $7.6150 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
billion. Reserve accumulation of $4.6 billion further contributed to foreign
borrowing of $9.5 billion in that year.
Data on external financing have been expressed in net terms; but, with the
accumulation of foreign debt, amortization charges increased rapidly, raising
Brazil's gross external financing requirements. As shown in Table 5, gross debt
service (interest payments and amortization), expressed as a proportion of
exports, increased from 42.8 percent in 1973 to 68.0 percent in 1978. In the
same period, the net debt service ratio, derived by adjusting for interest re-
ceipts, rose from 37.5 percent to 63.0 percent.
With increased borrowing, the stock of foreign debt increased from $12.6
billion on 31 December 1973 to $43.5 billion at the end of 1978, representing
13.9 percent and 24.2 percent of GNP respectively. Deducting the value of net
reserve holdings from these data, the relevant figures are $6.2 billion and $31.6




As already noted, the effects of external shocks on Mexico's balance of pay-
ments were substantially smaller than in the other two countries under study
(1.4 percent of GNP in 1974 as compared with 3.5 percent in Brazil and 5.0
percent in Uruguay). At the same time, Mexico experienced substantial in-
creases in import shares or negative import substitution, representing a loss of
$1,136 million which exceeded the balance of payments effects of external
shocks ($758 million) by a substantial margin. With the decline in export
market shares, giving rise to a loss of $93 million in "1972" prices, and an im-
port saving of $8 million due to the deceleration of the growth of GNP, the
resource gap increased from $0.4 billion in "1972" to $1.6 billion in 1974.
In the same period, interest payments and dividends increased from $0.8
billion to $1.6 billion, bringing total external financing requirements to $3.2
billion in 1974. The principal source of financing was foreign borrowing which
rose from $0.8 billion in "1972" to $3.1 billion in 1974. The differences are
smaller if adjustment is made for errors and omissions; the adjusted figures
are $0.7 billion and $2.3 billion.
Negative import substitution and decreases in export market shares show
the direct and indirect effects of expansionary fiscal policies followed by the
Echeverria Administration from 1972. These policies involved rapid increases
in government expenditures without commensurate increases in revenues. In
terms of current prices, the deficit in the government budget increased from 5
billion pesos in 1971 to 17 billion pesos in 1972, 27 billion pesos in 1973, and 33
billion pesos in 1974, reaching 3.6 percent of GNP in that year. The deficit was
financed in part by money creation and in part by borrowing in domestic and
in foreign capital markets. The money supply rose by 18 percent in nominal
terms in 1972, 22 percent in 1973, and 21 percent in 1974.EXTERNAL SHOCKS 151
Expansionary fiscal policies contributed to inflation with a time lag. The
wholesale price index rose by 16 percent in 1973 and 23 percent in 1974 as
compared with an average of 3 percent in the preceding two years. With the
peso-dollar exchange rate remaining at 12.50, the real exchange rate appreci-
ated by 3 percent in both 1973 and 1974 vis-a-vis the US dollar, although the
extent of appreciation was less vis-a-vis other currencies.
However, changes in wholesale prices and in the real exchange rate did not
fully reflect the effects of the expansionary policies, since Mexico's close trading
relationships with the US limited the rise in domestic prices. Correspondingly,
producers could not fully translate increases in wages averaging 28 percent in
1974 into higher prices, and profit margins declined, adversely affecting
domestic production and hence the balance of trade. Also, expansionary poli-
cies directly affected the trade balance by reducing exportable supplies through
increases in domestic demand as well as through "leaks" into higher imports.
In 1975, the budget deficit increased further in real terms. At the same time,
with the continued maintenance of fixed parities, the real exchange rate ap-
preciated by an additional one percent vis-a-vis the US and by 2 percent vis-
a-vis Mexico's major trading partners. Finally, uncertainties relating to
rumored changes in Echeverria's policies and the fall of the peso in forward
markets contributed to a decline in the rate of growth of GNP from 5.3 percent
in 1974 to 3.5 percent in 1975.
The favorable balance of payments effects of lower growth rates were much
overshadowed, however, by the decline in Mexico's export market shares, repre-
senting a loss of $235 million in 1975 in terms of "1972" prices. Exports were
also adversely affected by the world recession while there was little change in
import substitution.
The net effect of these changes was to increase Mexico's resource gap from
$1.6 billion in 1974 to $2.5 billion in 1975. With interest payments and divi-
dends of $1.9 billion, Mexico's total external financial requirements reached
$4.4 billion in 1975. In the same year, foreign borrowing amounted to $4.9
billion, or $3.6 billion if we adjust for errors and omissions, while foreign
direct investment was $0.6 billion.
The budgetary deficit increased again in real terms in 1976, inflation ac-
celerated, and the balance of payments deteriorated further. In response to
these changes, on 1 September 1976 the Echeverria Administration abandoned
the fixed parity of the peso. Simultaneously, however, export subsidies were
eliminated and, coupled with rapid inflation in the wake of the depreciation
of the peso, the competitiveness of Mexican exports declined again.
Correspondingly, Mexico's position in export markets deteriorated further.
At the same time, imports fell in absolute terms in part because of import sub-
stitution in response to the depreciation of the peso, and in part because of the
deceleration of economic expansion. The rate of growth of GNP declined to152 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
1.3 percent in 1976 as unsettled conditions in financial markets, labor unrest,
and land seizures undermined business confidence.
Notwithstanding the loss in export market shares, the fall in imports, to-
gether with favorable changes in the terms of trade and improvements in
foreign business conditions, resulted in a decline in net external financial re-
quirements from $2.5 billion in 1975 to $1.5 billion in 1976. The decline was
only partly offset by increases in interest payments and dividends from $1.9
billion to $2.3 billion. For the first time in the 1970s, Mexico reduced its
foreign exchange reserves, by $0.6 billion, to finance its deficit while unsettled
conditions in financial markets were reflected in errors and omissions of —$3.0
billion that partly offset foreign borrowing of $5.2 billion.
The peso reached its lowest point, with 28 pesos to the dollar, shortly before
the inauguration of the administration of Lopez Portillo in January 1977. It
stabilized afterwards and remained in the 22-23 range during the next two
years. The new administration also lowered the budgetary deficit, and let the
money supply decline, in real terms. And, although inflationary pressures were
aggravated, the depreciation of the peso was sufficient to raise its real value in
1977 by over 10 percent above the 1976 level, regardless of whether compari-
sons were made with the US dollar or with the currencies of Mexico's major
trading partners.
The depreciation of the real exchange rate had its principal effect on import
substitution, resulting in a further decline in the constant-price value of im-
ports, notwithstanding the increase in the growth rate of GNP from 1.3 per-
cent in 1976 to 3.7 percent in 1977. It had less of an impact on exports as the
effects of the devaluation were largely offset by the abolition of export sub-
sidies, except that increases in the exports of petroleum added $1.0 billion to
Mexico's foreign exchange earnings in 1977.
As a result of these changes, Mexico's resource gap turned into a small
surplus in 1977. However, interest payments and dividends gave rise to total
external financial requirements of $2.3 billion. Gross financial requirements
were raised further by the amortization of Mexico's foreign debt. The gross
debt service ratio was 100 percent in 1977 as compared with 67 percent in
1973.
1
3 Net debt service ratios were only slightly lower.
1
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The deus ex machina of petroleum exports added $1.8 billion to Mexico's
foreign exchange earnings in 1978 and an improvement was also shown in
market shares for nonfuel exports, largely reflecting the effects of the reintro-
duction of export subsidies; but the return to expansionary policies, with the
budget deficit increasing by one-half and the money supply by one-sixth in real
terms, led to a deterioration in Mexico's balance of trade. Apart from increases
in imports as a result of the 6.5 percent rise in GNP, pressures on domestic
capacity and the appreciation of the real exchange rate greatly increased the
extent of negative import substitution.EXTERNAL SHOCKS 153
The ensuing deterioration of Mexico's trade balance was nearly offset by
improvements in nonfactor services. Nevertheless, as a result of increases in
interest payments and dividends, total external financial requirements came to
amount to $3.0 billion in 1978. This was largely financed by foreign borrowing
($3.0 billion), adjusted for a negative balance on errors and omissions ($0.6
billion).
With increased foreign borrowing, Mexico's gross external debt increased
from $26.8 billion at the end of 1977 to $32.6 billion at the end of 1978; the
corresponding figure was $8.3 billion at the end of 1973. Deducting the value
of net reserve holdings, the relevant figures are $7.0 billion in 1973, $25.4 bil-
lion in 1977, and $30.7 billion in 1978, representing 13.3 percent, 31.5 percent,
and 33.4 percent of the gross domestic product, respectively. The gross debt
service ratio reached 113 percent, and net debt service ratio attained 109 per-
cent, in 1978.
Uruguay
Among the three countries, Uruguay suffered the largest external shocks in
1974, amounting to 5.0 percent of its GNP, largely on account of the deteriora-
tion of its terms of trade. In response to this situation, the government reduced
the rate of growth of the money supply from 80 percent in 1973 to 64 percent
in 1974. With rapid inflation, the real value of the money supply fell by 8
percent.
But the high rate of inflation also led to reductions in the real value of
government revenue and increases in the budget deficit. Furthermore, Uruguay
failed to devalue pari passu with inflation, so that the real exchange rate ap-
preciated by 7 percent between 1973 and 1974, regardless of whether compari-
sons are made with US or with Uruguay's principal trading partners.
With the fall in the real exchange rate, changes in export shares and in
import substitution were small. Correspondingly, the government relied on
foreign borrowing to finance its resource gap. Foreign borrowing reportedly
amounted to $160 million, as compared with total external financing of $136
million, of which interest payments and dividends represented $47 million.
With negative errors and omissions of $82 million partly compensating for re-
ported foreign borrowing, Uruguay also drew on its reserves in the amount of
$40 million.
Important policy changes were made in July 1974. They included decon-
trolling domestic prices, eliminating import quotas, and abolishing minimum
foreign financing requirements for imports, with exceptions made for capital
goods in the latter case. Also, the indexing of financial obligations was intro-
duced and interest rates raised so as to stimulate domestic savings, and foreign
capital movements were liberalized. Finally, the system of minidevaluations was
adjusted so as to depreciate the peso in real terms.154 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
In 1975, the depreciation of the real exchange rate approximately offset its
appreciation in 1974 vis-a-vis the currencies of Uruguay's principal trading
partners, and a devaluation of 11 percent occurred vis-a-vis the US dollar.
Also, tariffs were lowered while nontraditional exports received tax and tariff
rebates, preferential credits, and tax relief. As a result of the imposition of these
measures, the longstanding bias against exports and in favor of import substitu-
tion was reduced to a considerable extent.
The liberalization of the economy led to an acceleration of economic growth
in late 1974 and in 1975, with GNP rising by 3.4 percent in 1974 and 3.9 per-
cent in 1975, following a decline in the early 1970s. Higher growth rates, and
reductions in protection, in turn, led to greater imports, although these changes
were overshadowed by increases in export market shares that represented a re-
sponse to improved export incentives.
But, with the continued deterioration in its terms of trade, due largely to a
fall in beef and wool prices, Uruguay's resource gap increased from $89 million
in 1974 to $118 million in 1975. Total financial requirements were raised fur-
ther by interest payments and dividends of $75 million and Uruguay again
relied on foreign borrowing ($165 million, reduced by negative errors and
omissions of $38 million) and on reductions in reserve holdings ($62 billion)
to provide the necessary financing.
Monetary policies became increasingly restrictive in mid-1975 and govern-
ment expenditures were reduced at the same time, although the budget deficit
did not decline until the following year. These measures contributed to a slow-
down in the rate of economic expansion, with GNP rising by 2.5 percent in
1976. At the same time, the measures taken earier, together with the further
depreciation of the real exchange rate, led to explosive increases in exports, in
particular manufactured exports. In 1976, three-tenths of exports represented
increases in export market shares over "1972." Expressed differently, actual ex-
ports were 44 percent higher than hypothetical exports, calculated under the
assumption of unchanged market shares. The corresponding figure was 212
percent for manufactured exports, 16 percent for traditional exports, and 23
percent for nontraditional primary exports.
The resulting increase in exports by $124 million in terms of "1972" prices
was responsible for the net positive effects of domestic policy measures that
amounted to $115 million in 1976, again expressed in "1972" prices. Cor-
respondingly, Uruguay's resource gap was eliminated in 1976 although interest
payments and dividends gave rise to total financial requirements of $78 million.
With the rebuilding of reserves ($73 million) and a small negative balance on
errors and omission ($13 million), foreign borrowing was $160 million in 1976.
Foreign borrowing increased in 1977, amounting to $238 million, to which
$35 million for errors and omissions should be added. Much of the proceeds of
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gap was $83 million and interest payments and dividends $79 million. An
important factor contributing to the increase in the resource gap was the decline
in beef exports that resulted from the application of protectionist policies in
the European Common Market. Manufactured exports continued their favor-
able performance while a decline in the export shares of nontraditional primary
exports is shown.
At the same time, the acceleration of economic growth, with GNP rising by
3.7 percent in 1977, contributed to increased imports while there was little im-
port substitution. All in all, the net positive balance of payments effects of
domestic policy measures are estimated at $63 million as compared with $115
million a year earlier. Note, however, that under the methodology utilized, the
effects of Common Market protection on Uruguay's beef imports are repre*
sented as a decline in export market shares.
Beef exports declined further in 1978, but gains in the exports of nontradi-
tional primary products and manufactured goods more than compensated for
the resulting loss in export market shares. There was also some import substi-
tution in 1978 that was more than offset by higher imports associated with a
GNP growth rate of 3.8 percent.
With domestic policies leading to improvements in the balance of payments
throughout the 1974-78 period and the growth of exports accelerating, the rise
in the gross debt service ratio from 32.9 percent in 1973 to 35.9 in 1975 was
followed by decreases to 25.6 percent in 1976 and 24.5 percent in 1977; and,
notwithstanding an increase to 30.1 percent in 1978, the 1973 level was not
exceeded in that year.
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Uruguay's external debt increased from $369 million at the end of 1973 to
$866 million at the end of 1978, with its ratio to GNP rising from 12.2 percent
to 16.8 percent during this period. Adjusting for net reserves, the relevant
figures were $168 million and $17 million, representing 5.6 percent and 0.3




In this paper I have examined the impact of external shocks in the form
of the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74 and the world recession of 1974-75,
followed by a slow recovery, on three Latin-American countries, Brazil, Mexico,
and Uruguay. In so doing, separate consideration has been given to terms of
trade effects and to export volume effects. I have further analyzed policy re-
sponses to these shocks, involving additional net external financing, export
promotion, import substitution, and lowering the rate of economic growth.
It has been shown that, in the 1974-78 period, terms-of-trade effects were
far more important than export volume effects in Brazil and Uruguay, which
import much of their energy requirements. On the average, export volume
effects were exceeded by terms-of-trade effects even in Mexico that benefited156 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
from the high price of petroleum, the exports of which assumed importance
from 1977. At the same time, the adverse export volume effects of lower eco-
nomic growth rates in the developed countries were partly offset by increases
in their propensity to import manufactured goods from the developing
countries.
Among the countries under study, Brazil did not follow consistent macro-
economic policies during the period under consideration but, on the whole,
aimed at maintaining rapid rates of economic growth in the face of the ad-
verse balance of payments effects of external shocks. At the same time, it
oriented public investment largely towards import substitution in intermediate
products, increased the protection of domestic industry, and favored import-
substituting industries in the allocation of preferential credits.
The measures applied led to a considerable degree of import substitution in
Brazil where, after increases in 1975, export shares declined again. At the same
time, import substitution proved to be increasingly costly, leading to a rise of
incremental capital-output ratios from 2.3 in 1964-73 to 3.1 in 1974-76 and
4.3 in 1977-79; the ratio was 1.7 in the 1971-73 period, when growth was espe-
cially rapid (Table 6).
With small increases in the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP,
expressed in terms of constant prices, the rise in incremental capital-output
ratios resulted in a decline in the rate of economic growth in Brazil. At the
same time, data expressed in terms of current prices indicate that the inflow of
capital did not modify the allocation of resources between consumption and
investment.
It would appear, then, that a substantial part of foreign borrowing went
into consumption, while the remainder, together with domestic savings, was
invested in activities that bring lower returns than had been the case in the
past. This finding suggests the need for improving the efficiency of the allo-
cation of investment funds. This objective would be served by reducing the
scope of government investment, making this more responsive to efficiency
criteria, lessening the antiexport bias in the incentive system, and reducing the
scope of preferential credits while adopting positive real interest rates.
Some steps in this direction were taken in 1979 and in the first half of 1980
under successive planning ministers, Mario Henrique Simonsen and Antonio
Delfin Netto, reducing the size of the public investment budget and modifying
the system of incentives. Still, more needs to be done in introducing rigorous
project evaluation in the public sector and improving incentives to exports
vis-a-vis import substitution. Furthermore, given Brazil's large indebtedness
and the 120 percent rise in petroleum prices between 1978 and mid-1980, a re-
duction in the rate of economic growth could not be forgone. This conclusion
is strengthened if we consider the need to lower the rate of inflation that
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In Mexico, an internal shock — the ambitious public expenditure program
of President Echeverria, undertaken without adequate financing — dominated
external shocks. With the exchange rate maintained unchanged until nearly the
end of the Echeverria Administration, unsustainable balance of payments defi-
cits emerged while labor unrest and land seizures undermined business
confidence.
Confidence was reestablished in the first year of Lopez Portillo's administra-
tion, which also limited money creation and the expansion of government
expenditure. Monetary expansion accelerated, however, in the following year
and the budget deficit increased again, approaching 5 percent of GNP. The
budget deficit, in turn, led to rapid increases in the real value of the money
supply.
As a result, the rate of inflation accelerated, exceeding 30 percent in the
first half of 1980 and there was a considerable spillover into higher imports.
Also, notwithstanding the rapid rise in oil earnings, Mexico continued to bor-
row abroad, thereby avoiding the depreciation of the peso. At the same time,
with the exchange rate remaining in the narrow range of 22.5-23.0 pesos to the
dollar in the face of rapid inflation, the competitive position of Mexican exports
again deteriorated. Finally, while some import liberalization occurred in 1977,
the appreciation of the peso in real terms led to increased demands for
protection.
These considerations point to the need to reduce reliance on foreign borrow-
ing and to accept exchange rate changes for the sake of improving the com-
petitiveness of the non-oil sector in Mexico. This would require, first of all,
lowering the budget deficit. It would further be necessary to introduce rigorous
project evaluation for public investment.
Apart from increasing the competitiveness of Mexican agriculture and in-
dustry, the proposed measures would reduce inflationary pressures and con-
tribute to the efficiency of investment. As shown in Table 6, incremental capital-
output ratios rose from 3.0 in 1964-73 to 4.1 in 1974-79; the ratio was 3.1 in
1971-73.
Among the three countries under study, Uruguay suffered by far the greatest
external shocks, the effects of which continued throughout the period under
consideration. The government used the occasion of the external shocks to
undertake long overdue reforms of the incentive system and to shift resources
from the public to the private sector, by reducing the budget deficit from about
four percent of GNP in 1974 and 1975 to less than one percent in 1977 and
1978.
These reforms led to the rapid expansion of exports and decreases in incre-
mental capital-output ratios from 9.6 in 1964-73 to 3.6 in 1974-76 and 3.3
in 1977-78 (the ratio was negative in 1971-73 when Uruguay's GNP declined).
With the rise in the share of gross domestic capital formation in GNP, expressed
in constant prices, from 10.4 percent in 1964-73 to 13.6 percent in 1974-76EXTERNAL SHOCKS 159
and 18.5 percent in 1977-79, after near-stagnation in the decade preceding the
quadrupling of petroleum prices, Uruguay experienced rapid economic growth.
The average annual rate of growth of GNP was 3.3 percent between 1973
and 1976; it rose to 5.0 percent between 1976 and 1979, with a rate of growth
of 8.4 percent in 1979.
As a result of greater export orientation, rapid economic growth was at-
tained with only a temporary increase in Uruguay's indebtedness. Thus, ex-
ternal debt, adjusted for net reserves other than gold, accounted for the same
proportion of GNP at the end of 1978 as five years earlier; the ratio declined
to a considerable extent if account is taken of the revaluation of gold holdings
that is included in the value of net reserves reported in Table 5.
The case of Uruguay shows that incentive reforms may permit surmounting
the effects of sizable external shocks. At the same time, further reforms would
be necessary in order to utilize fully the country's growth potential. These
would involve additional reductions in tariffs and the rationalization of agri-
cultural interventions. Also, there is need to avoid an appreciation of the cur-
rency in real terms that is said to be desired for the sake of reducing the rate
of inflation.
The results further show the contrast between the policies followed by
Uruguay and Brazil, the two countries that experienced external shocks of
considerable magnitude after 1973. Uruguay was able to surmount these shocks
without a rise in its external debt ratio by turning toward outward-orientation
and increasing reliance on the private sector. In turn, Brazil increased the bias
in the incentive system in favor of import substitution and against exports, it
further promoted import substitution through public investments, and accepted
a considerable increase in its external debt for the purpose of maintaining
rapid economic growth.
Nonetheless, with increases in incremental capital-output ratios, the rate of
growth of GNP declined in Brazil while the opposite was the case in Uruguay.
As a result, in the 1976-79 period, the growth rate of GNP of Uruguay came
to exceed that of Brazil, with an acceleration shown in the former and a decel-
eration in the latter during this period. The differences are even larger in per
capita terms; 4.3 percent in Uruguay and 2.4 percent in Brazil between 1976
and 1979. The corresponding figure was 2.5 percent in Mexico, where this re-
sult was attained at the expense of rapid increases in the external debt.
NOTES
1. Throughout this paper exports refer to merchandise exports, valued in f.o.b.
prices and imports refer to merchandise imports valued in ci.f. prices.
2. The index numbers reported in United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
(December 1971 and June 1977) are 103 including, and 93 excluding, fuels in 1971-73
on a 1970 basis; the comparable averages for the 1961-70 period are 101 and 98
respectively.160 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
3. For example, if import and export prices rose by 50 percent and 40 percent,
respectively, between "1972" and 1978, and imports and exports valued in "1972"
prices were $220 million and $200 million, the estimated terms of trade effect will
be $30 million, the (pure) terms-of-trade effect for balanced trade $20 million, and
that for unbalanced trade $10 million.
4. Traditional exports have been defined to include all commodities that accounted
for at least 1.5 percent of the country's merchandise exports in 1971-73. Manufactured
goods have been defined as SITC categories 5 to 8 less 68; fuels as SITC category 3;
nontraditional primary exports other than fuels include the remainder.
5. Estimates of balance of payments effects pertaining to individual years are
shown on a "1972" basis. Changes between individual years can be derived as the
difference between the reported estimates for consecutive years.
6. It should be recalled that developments in particular years are derived as dif-
ferences in the estimates for consecutive years.
7. It should be noted, however, that the outcome is affected by efforts made by
developing countries to increase export supply.
8. As export shortfalls are shown with a positive sign, a negative sign denotes an
improvement in Appendix Table 2.
9. The latter result is, however, affected by the choice of "1972" as the base period.
This is because the high GNP growth rate in 1973 raised the average for the "1972"-
1978 period.
10. We did not net out interest receipts on the grounds that these relate largely to
holdings of foreign exchange reserves. Such is the case in Brazil, Uruguay, and to a
lesser extent in Mexico.
11. A ratio of 60 percent means that actual imports were 37 percent lower than
what they would have been in the absence of import substitution.
12. Net reserves were defined as the sum of foreign exchange holdings, gold re-
serves as valued by the national authorities, SDR holdings, reserve position in the
International Montary Fund, less the use of Fund credit. Changes in the valuation of
gold are reflected in the reserve figures in Table 5 but are not included with changes
in reserves in Table 1.
13. The gross debt service ratio was 49 percent in 1974, when debt repayments
were postponed on account of Mexico's balance of payments deficit.
14. As elsewhere in the paper, exports are defined to include merchandise exports
only. The inclusion of tourism would add $3.2 billion to exports in 1978, reducing
the gross debt service ratio to 75 percent and the net debt service ratio to 72 percent.
However, against this figure there is a debit item of $2.3 billion on account of tourism
by Mexicans abroad. (In Brazil tourist expenditures abroad exceeded the small tourist
receipts.)
15. The gross debt service ratio was only 16.5 percent in 1974, when loan repay-
ments were postponed due to Uruguay's large balance of payments deficit.
16. Gold accounted for two-thirds of reserve holdings at the end of 1978. Increases
in the national valuation of gold holdings, from $149 million at the end of 1973 to
$562 million at the end of 1978, largely reflect increases in the price of gold. But
reserves other than gold also increased from $52 million at the end of 1973 to $287
million at the end of 1978, offsetting the rise in the gross external debt as a propor-
tion of GNP.~ <
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Appendix Table 2
FOREIGN-DEMAND-INDUCED CHANCES IN EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS IN BRAZIL (US $nllllon In "1972" prices)
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*DC—developed countries; LDC—less developed countries; CPE—centrally planned economies. Numbers Bay not add up
because of rounding.EXTERNAL SHOCKS 163
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Appendix Table 4
RATIOS OF HYPOTHETICAL, TREND, AND ACTUAL EXPORTS: TRADITIONAL PRIMARY PRODUCTS
SITC 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1974-78
Code Average
Brazil
Oil Meat, fresh, chilled, frozen
Hypo thetical/trend
Actual/hypothetical
0611 Sugar, raw, centrifugal
Hypothetical/trend
Actual/hypothetical




























0111 Bovine meat, fresh, etc.
Hypothetical/trend
Actual/hypothetical






0611 Sugar, raw, centrifugal
Hypothetical/trend
Actual/hypothetical




Hypo the t ical/trend
Actual/hypothetical
Uruguay


























































































































































































































































Comment on "Policy Responses to External Shocks
in Selected Latin-American Countries"
Carlos A. Longo*
University of Sao Paulo
Bela Balassa developed an interesting framework designed to measure the
impact of external shocks on the balance of payments of three developing coun-
tries: Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay. Through a gradual and ingenious decom-
position of the balance of payments identity, he was able to express two ex-
ternal shocks and various policy responses as separate components on each side
of the identity. Specifically, he quantified the external shocks of the qua-
drupling of oil prices in 1973-74 and the following world recession of 1974—75.
In this setting, separate consideration was given, on the one hand, to the ad-
verse terms-of-trade effect resulting from the change in oil prices and, sec-
ond, to the adverse export effect resulting from the world recession and sub-
sequent slow recovery in developed countries. Furthermore, domestic policy
responses to these external shocks were quantified in the form of export pro-
motion, import substitution, lowering the rate of economic growth, and addi-
tional net external financing.
One of the study's major findings is the relative importance of the terms-of-
trade effect, at least in Brazil and Uruguay, as compared with the unfavorable
effects of the 1974-75 recession. The deterioration of their terms of trade
amounted to about 50 percent of the average value of their exports in the
1974-77 period. Mexico's terms of trade loss was only 16.8 percent of average
export value. The decline in foreign demand as a proportion of exports equaled
6.5 percent in Uruguay, 8.2 percent in Brazil, and 11.9 percent in Mexico dur-
ing this period.
On the other hand, there are considerable differences among the three coun-
tries of policy responses to external shocks in the 1974-77 period. Uruguay
showed the best performance during this period, with increases in its export
market shares accounting for more than 20 percent of its export. Brazil leads
the way in terms of import substitution. This item was responsible for a de-
crease in its imports of about 22 percent. Mexico relied heavily on foreign
borrowing to finance higher imports and decreased exports. Additional ex-
ternal financing amounted to about 90 percent of the average value of exports
in Mexico, while the corresponding item was 26.7 percent in Brazil and 41.7
percent in Uruguay.
I admire the first half of Balassa's work. It gives us a good summary view of
the magnitudes and relative weight of the principal elements of external shocks
and policy responses in these economies. In the second half of the paper Balassa166 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
takes these countries individually and discusses at length, year by year, some
of their main aggregate statistics, such as growth rates, exchange rate move-
ments, money supply, and government expenditures, and tries to relate them
to his measured shocks and responses. I failed to understand how this essen-
tially descriptive material integrates with the rest of the paper. Policy issues are
discussed here, at least by implication, but they are not explicit. Almost no
effort is made to assess and compare the successes and failures of the measured
responses to external shocks.
An alternative interpretation for the data provided in the first half of the
paper might rest on a careful evaluation and comparison of the broad policy
responses identified in the three economies. In this setting, one might ask
whether there is any pattern of policy response in these countries, given their
comparative advantages and institutional constraints, however defined. For
example, this study indicates that Brazil and Uruguay, faced with a significant
terms-of-trade effect, reacted through widely different policies. Brazil sought
a strong policy of import substitution and Uruguay relied on an aggressive
policy of export promotion. Was this an accident of exclusively political con-
cern or could it be rationalized by some kind of economic reasoning? Also,
Mexico, which was less affected by external shocks, seems not to have cared
about balance of payments troubles. The data suggest that Mexico increased its
imports and reduced its exports and paid for them dearly through massive ex-
ternal borrowing. Are these broadly identified diverse policy responses amenable
to standard economic interpretation? If they are, then Balassa could add more
wisdom to this work through a comparative policy analysis.
A more fundamental observation applies to the methodology itself. It has
been assumed that all policies are independent responses to either an increase
in import prices or a shift to the left in the demand for exports, or both. This,
of course, is a simplification, since crossed effects between policy responses and
external shocks are not considered. For example, a deceleration of exports by
competing suppliers will show up as an export promotion policy, and a lower
demand abroad inducing lower growth rates domestically will show up as a
"successful" reduced growth policy. In this sense, as Balassa recognizes in the
text, it is not possible to distinguish clearly between autonomous and induced
policy responses.
Observed trade statistics of balance of payments are here attributed in a
simple form to external shocks and policy reactions. But at any date in the
future these elements should be measured by what the trade statistics at that
time would have been and not by what is happening to trade at that time. Other
forces that simultaneously influence observed trade statistics, such as real cost
changes due to technical progress, financial cost changes due to a rise in the
interest rate abroad, demand changes due to varying income elasticities of de-
mand as real income rises, and bad harvest due to climatic accidents are notEXTERNAL SHOCKS 167
considered. The two sets of forces — those captured in the model and those
induced by exogenous and natural growth — are intermixed. The composition
of trade may change considerably, as time elapses, due to these forces. The
shorter the period under analysis, the more likely it is that the forces defined
in the model will dominate. But the longer the time lapse the more would
exogenous induced effects dominate, and the harder it will be to distinguish ex-
ternal shocks and policy responses. On the other hand, the shorter the time
lapse, the harder it is to trust the estimated policy variables, since sudden
shocks would be largely reflected in "additional external financing," the resid-
uum variable in this model. All this, of course, does not deny the importance
of the measurements being taken here but only suggests that they may not be
conclusive.
NOTE
*Fundacao Institute de Pesquisas Economical Many thanks are due J. Rizzieri,
C. L. Martone, and M. B. Pinto for their comments. Errors and omissions are, of
course, my responsibility.